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influence the character and composition of the House of Representatives.10 5

But sirl What of the Constitution?

Charles E. Rice*
Powell v. McCormack is an unfortunate decision, principally

because the Supreme Court should never have exercised its jurisdiction over the case. The ruling, however, is chiefly open to criticism,
not because it is demonstrably contrary to established rules of law,

but because it runs counter to those less clearly articulated, and
essentially precatory, admonitions of judicial restraint which are
implicit in the separation of governmental powers. The crucial point

is not the jurisdiction of the subject matter, the Speech or Debate
Clause, the issue of mootness raised by Justice Stewart in dissent or
the substantive merits of Adam Clayton Powell's exclusion. Rather,
the crucial point is justiciability-the problem of whether, out of a
due regard for the separation of powers, the Court should refrain
from exercising the jurisdiction which it otherwise might exercise.
Powell v. McCormack is primarily vulnerable on this issue.1
There is no compulsion upon the Supreme Court to exercise jurisdiction in every case in which it is conferred. On the contrary, there are
situations where the most salutary use of the judicial power lies in
abstention.2 This is particularly true where political questions are

raised.
The fact that a case "seeks the enforcement of a political right
105 Curtis, The Power of the House of Representatives to Judge the Qualifications of Its Members, 45 TExAs L. REv. 1199, 1202-03 (1967). Cf. Eckhardt, The
Adam Clayton Powell Case, id. at 1206, 1210-11.
* Professor of Law, Notre Dame Law School.
1 This should not be confused with jurisdiction of the subject matter, as the

District Court confused the two. Powell v. McCormack, 266 F. Supp. 354 (D.D.C.
1967). On the contrary, as the Court of Appeals and the Supreme Court both held,
the Powell case did vest the courts with jurisdiction of the subject matter, pursuant
to the criteria laid down in Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 198 (1962): (1) the cause
must "arise under" the Federal Constitution, laws or treaties (or fall within one
of the other enumerated categories of Article III, Section 2), and (2) the cause
must be a "case or controversy" within the meaning of Article III, Section 2, and
(3) the cause must be described in a jurisdictional statute enacted by Congress.
2 See Scbarpf, Judicial Review and the Political Question: A Functional Analysis,
75 YALE L.J. 517 (1966). See also Justice Brandeis' enumeration in Ashwander v.
Tennessee Valley Authority, 297 U.S. 288, 346-48 (1936).
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or a claim to political office, as here, does not necessarily mean that
it raises a political question."' In Baker v. Carr4 the Court ruled
that "the nonjusticiability of a political question is primarily a function of the separation of powers." 5 Since Baker v. Carr and Bond v.
Floyd6 involved confrontations between the federal and state governments, rather than between co-ordinate branches of the federal
government, they did not present political questions as above defined. Powell v. McCormack, however, presents just such a confrontation. If the separation of powers is not involved in Powell in
such a way as to constitute a political question, it is difficult to envision a case where it ever would be involved. It clearly involved, as
was noted in the opinion by Circuit Judge Burger,7 three of the six
factors described in Baker v. Carr as symptomatic of a nonjusticiable political question:
1. A textually demonstrable constitutional commitment of the
issue to a coordinate political department. Article I, Section
5, clearly provides this commitment.
2.

A lack of judicially discoverable and manageable standards
for resolving it.'

3. The impossibility of a court's undertaking independent
resolution without expressing lack of the respect due coordinate branches of government.
At the very least, it is unrealistic for the Supreme Court to
conclude that its ruling in Powell entails no disrespect for the House
of Representatives. Again the Burger opinion put the problem in
focus:
Any judgment which enjoined execution of House Resolution 278,
or commanded the Speaker of the House to administer the oath, or
commanded Members of the House as to any action or vote within
the Chamber would inevitably bring about a direct confrontation with
a co-equal branch and if that did not indicate lack of respect due that
Branch, it would at best be a gesture hardly comporting with our ideas
of separate co-equal branches of the federal establishment. These circumstances would give rise to a classic political question and fall within
the definition of such a question under Baker. On this record, therefore,
S Powell v. McCormack, 395 F.2d 577, 591 (D.C. Cir. 1968).

369 U.S. 186 (1962).
5 Id. at 210.
4

6 385 U.S. 116 (1966).

7 395 F.2d at 593-95.
8 As the Burger opinion put it,

"...

courts do not possess the requisite means

to fashion a meaningful remedy to compel Members of the House to vote to seat
Mr. Powell or to compel The Speaker to administer the oath." Id. at 594.
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the claims of Appellants for coercive equitable relief are inappropriate
for judicial consideration.9
The majority of the Court, however, was not deterred by the
prospect of a confrontation with Congress. The theory of the majority seems to be that the determination of a basic right by the Supreme Court carries with it a sort of absolutist entitlement to a
single-minded enforcement of that right-with insufficient regard
for other rights, whether of Congress or the states, which may interfere. In some matters there was lacking in the Warren Court a due
regard for that salutary diffidence in the exercise of power which is
often the lubricant for the machinery of coordinate branches of
government. As Circuit Judge Burger put it,
Conflicts between our co-equal federal branches are not merely
unseemly but often destructive of important values. In the interpretation of provisions which are pregnant with such conflicts the
unavailability of a remedy and the consequences of any unresolved
confrontation between coordinate branches weigh heavily in pointing
to a conclusion either that no jurisdiction was intended or that if jurisdiction exists it should not be exercised. 10

Unfortunately, in recent years, the Supreme Court has taken
entirely too literally the principle it articulated for itself in Baker v.
Carr that "[i]t is the responsibility of this Court to act as the ultimate interpreter of the Constitution."" It is the responsibility of
the President and Congressmen as well to guide their actions by
the Constitution. And it is quite clear that in some areas the judgments of the Chief Executive or of Congress as to constitutionality
are to be given finality, whether it be through an absolute denial to
the courts of jurisdiction of the subject matter or a no less emphatic
though implicit interdict against judicial intervention in certain
areas where jurisdiction is technically present but where its exercise would disrupt the balance among coordinate branches of government. It would be helpful for the Court to recur to the principle
enunciated by Justice Harlan in his dissent in the 1964 legislative
apportionment decisions:
[t]hese decisions give support to a current mistaken view of the Constitution and the constitutional function of this Court. This view, in

a nutshell, is that every major social ill in this country can find its cure
in some constitutional "principle," and that this Court should "take
the lead" in promoting reform when other branches of government fail
to act. The Constitution is not a panacea for every blot upon the
public welfare, nor should this Court, ordained as a judicial body, be
9 Id. at 596.
10 Id. at 604-O.

11 Powell v. McCormack, 395 U.S. 486, 549 (1969). See also Baker v. Carr, 369
U.S. 186, 211 (1962) ; Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803).
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thought of as a general haven for reform movements. The Constitution
is an instrument of government, fundamental to which is the premise
that in a diffusion of governmental authority lies the greatest promise
that this Nation will realize liberty for all its citizens. This Court,
limited in function in accordance with that premise, does not serve its
high purpose when it exceeds its authority, even to satisfy justified
impatience with the slow workings of the political process. For when,
in the name of constitutional interpretation, the Court adds something
to the Constitution that was deliberately excluded from it, the Court
substitutes its view of what should be so for the amending
in reality
process. 12
Although Powell v. McCormack was an unfortunate decision,
the damage done by it is largely symbolic and not irremediable. It is
not likely that such cases will arise often and, if they should, Congress could exercise its broad power to expel, as distinguished from
exclude, by a two-thirds vote. Even if the House of Representatives
were to exclude an elected representative in circumstances substantially indistinguishable from Powell, it still would remain open for
the Supreme Court simply to decline to review the case. Such would
amount to an implicit overruling of the Powell decision, but it would
avoid a constitutional crisis. We are entitled to hope that such a
crisis will be avoided by the exercise of caution in both the Congress
and the Supreme Court. But we may fairly hope, too, that succeeding terms of the Supreme Court will see a redirection of attitude in
the specific area of justiciability and in the broader functioning of
the Court as a coequal and not a "supreme" branch of government.

Stanley K. Laughlin, Jr.*
Formal logic intended universal validity for the laws of thought.
And indeed, without universality, thought would be a private, noncommittal affair, incapable of understanding the smallest sector of
existence. Thought is always more and other than individual thinking;
if I start thinking of individual persons in a specific situation, I find
them in a supra-individual context of which they partake, and I think
in general concepts. All objects of thought are universals. But it is
equally true that the supra-individual meaning, the universality of a
concept, is never merely a formal one; it is constituted in the interrelationship between the (thinking and acting) subjects and their
world. Logical extraction is also sociological abstraction. There is a
logical mimesis which formulates the laws of thought in protective
12 Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 624-25 (1964).

* Professor of Law, Ohio State University.
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accord with the laws of society, but it is only one mode of thought
among others.
-Herbert Marcuse, One-Dimensional Man.'

When, as in the Powell Case, members of a democratically
chosen governing body exclude the duly elected representative of
one of their constituencies, the basic vulnerability of representative
democracy is exposed. The same type of vulnerability was illustrated
by the acute malapportionment of state legislatures that preceded
Baker v. Carr.2 Throughout his dissenting opinion in that case, the
late Justice Frankfurter condescendingly referred to the under-franchised Tennesseans who brought the suit as "these petitioners."
Meanwhile, upon the putative legislators of the state, who held
office by virtue of their own dogged adherence to an illegal and
unconstitutional "crazy-quilt" apportionment scheme, the Justice
bestowed the simple but ponderous accolade "Tennessee."
Frankfurter would have presumed that those men who currently
wore the governmental mantle must be, ipso facto, the government,
and would have used that premise to establish their legitimacy. One
hundred and fifty-nine years earlier, however, John Marshall had
presumed that the Supreme Court possessed the ultimate power to
interpret the Constitution and, proceeding from that premise, established that it did have.'
From the time when the Senate offered a crown to Caesar, up to
the time of the Rhode Island government of Marshall's day, a major
threat to democratic government had been the possibility that the
people's transient governors would change the ground rules and make
themselves intransigent. In Marbury v. Madison, Marshall, speaking
in terms obviously inspired by Rousseau, referred to the people's
right to exercise their "[o] riginal and supreme will [to organize] the
government... [and] establish certain limits not to be transcended
by [it] .,4 Such a solution to the ultimate dilemma of government by
the people was particularly appropriate for the Age of Reason and
largely dependent upon its precepts. Constitutionalism presupposed
that honest men, applying reason and neutrally predetermined techniques could fairly interpret the social contract without regard to
preferred outcomes. Whether or not Justice Marshall entertained
doubt on this score, many of his contemporaries and some of his
predecessors already had. Marshall's colleague, Story, acknowledged
in Martin v. Hunter's Lessee that "judges of equal learning and in1 H. MARCUSE, ONE DrImNsIoNAL MAN 138-39 (Beacon ed. 1964).
2 369 U.S. 186 (1962).
8 Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803).
4 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) at 176.
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tegrity . . .might differently interpret .. .the constitution itself."5
And, of course, the anti-federalists (among others) shared the belief
of Bishop Hoadly that the law interpreter would, in fact, become the
law giver.
By the first third of the Twentieth Century, a series of events
had brought this conflict to a head. Freud, himself an eminent rationalist, had cast forever in doubt man's ability to fairly apply reason to his interpersonal affairs. Meanwhile, political developments
in the United States that cast the Supreme Court in the role of rear
guard for economic liberalists were making more obvious the Court's
role as a law giver. Adding Freud's fuel to earlier legal skepticism,
the writers known as Legal Realists, exposed with appealing clarity
the sophistry of politically motivated judicial opinions. A new class
of justices emerged for whom the watchword became "judicial restraint"; that court judges best which interferes least with other
branches of government. But, as so often is the case, the fresh air
let in by iconoclasts soon created an unwanted chill. The old guard
had practiced judicial activism on behalf of economic laissez-faire.
The new breed exercised judicial restraint on behalf of the principle
of representative democracy. But, judicial restraint began to look
less appealing as the political establishment took advantage of its
own absence of restraint, not to institute reform but for the perpetuation of its own self-interest.' Conceptually, judicial restraint came
a cropper in the Reapportionment Cases. How could the Court practice restraint with regard to legislative action in deference to the will
of the people when the issue before the Court was what to do when
the legislature in no sense represented the people? 7
Meanwhile, the scholarly crisis progressed along similar paths.
Many constitutional scholars seemed to be putting old wine in new
bottles. In a cryptic, one-shot epistle, an eminent lawyer suggested
that since it had been proven that the principles by which judges
in the past had "neutrally" decided cases were not, in fact, neutral,
we should now climb to a higher mountain, there to discover new,
transcendent "neutral principles." ' Noble as the aspiration was (and
more than a few were inspired by it) Professor Wechsler neither
then nor since has suggested just how this might be done. Others
appealed to quasi-mystical concepts such as "lawyer-like" decision5 14 U.S. (1 Wheat.) 304, 346 (1816).
6 For a highly original analysis of this problem see Reich, The New Property,
73 YALE L.J. 733 (1964).
7 See Baldwin & Laughlin, The Reapportionment Cases: A Study in the Constitutional Adjudication Process, 17 U. FLA. L. REv. 301 (1964).
8 Wechsler, Toward Neutral Principles of ConstitutionalLaw, 73 HAav. L. Rav. 1
(1959).
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makingY The nostalgic harkening back to an older security was selfevident. Some scholars worked out elaborate, and often brilliant,
technical manuals for the slick application of judicial restraint and
called it a new jurisprudence.' 0 This scholarship, however, smacked
of the pro-establishment relativism that has become the grating agitation of younger social scientists. Some academic commentators
threw these all in one bag and mixed in some of the pop criticism of
the Court, seemingly oblivious to the contradictions between the
various themes." What most of these critiques had in common was
what psychiatrists call "secondary gain." They all pointed toward
less action on the part of the Court.
In this post-realist, post judicial restraint milieu, the Warren
Court decided the Powell case. White liberals had joined southern
racists in the vanguard of the "Dump Powell Movement." Powell's
unrepented sinning and dusky color made it possible this one time
for them to satisfy both their consciences and their racially frustrated constituents. Black men almost universally saw the Powell
exclusion as an exhibition of racism and their evaluation is hard to
dispute. Given the fact that Congress usually refuses even to investigate the gravest charges against its members, and when forced by
public pressure to do so normally deals out ineffective reprimands
for offenses that would send other public officials into limbo, it is
hard to understand the swift and severe meting out of punishment
in Powell's case in other than racial terms. Powell asked for, and
got, the full pent-up resentment of the white community. In light
of the recent mayoralty campaigns, there can be little dispute that
racism is politics. The fact that it is a particularly current political
force does not detract from the principle involved. The Powell case
must be seen as one in which the representatives of a political majority sought to disparage the representation of a political minority.
That is not to say that the Powell case was one of the most
difficult, important, or challenging cases that the Warren Court
faced. The seating of Powell in the 90th Congress without seniority
and with $25,000 fine represented a virtual settlement of the matter.
Congress had extracted (and Powell had yielded) its pound (or halfpound) of flesh. What the Court could do to repair the damage was
9 Hart, The Supreme Court 1958 Term: Foreword: The Time Chart of the
Justices, 73 HARV. L. REV. 84 (1959). Cf. Arnold, Professor Hart's Theology, 73
HARV. L. REV. 1298 (1960).
10 Kurland, The Supreme Court 1963 Term: Foreword: Equal in Origin and
Equal in Title to the Legislative and Executive Branches of the Government, 78
HARV. L. REv. 143 (1964).
11 A. BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH: THE SUPREME COURT AT THE
BAR OF POLITICS (1962).
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minimal. By virtue of the same settlement the potential conflict between the Court and Congress was reduced to name-calling.12
On the doctrinal level, the Court in Powell clearly had the upper hand on three issues and better than held its own on the other
two.
On the ultimate constitutional merits, to say that the portion
of the Constitution providing that Congress shall have power to
"Judge . . . the Elections, Returns and Qualifications of its own

Members,"'1 3 fairly interpreted means the power to judge its members only with reference to their constitutional eligibility and the
regularity of their election is an eminently reasonable interpretation
of the text, consistent with a rational conception of the nature of
representative government and a position often taken by Congressmen themselves (including many in this case).
The Court has already given Congress far more immunity under the Speech and Debate Clause than a literal reading of the text
requires.' 4 Extending it to anyone acting under congressional direction would have been an innovation of extreme dimensions.
The respondent's suggestion that the Court read jurisdictional
exceptions into the unambiguous language of 28 United States Code
1331, on the basis of an inference from a clearly inapplicable 1870
statute, 5 bordered on frivolous. The respondent Congressmen would
have screamed with righteous indignation if the Court had so warped
one of their statutes to reach a result that they did not like.
The mootness issue was considerably more complex. To advocates of the "passive virtues," it did, as Justice Stewart pointed out,
offer a plausible means of refraining "from deciding ... novel, difficult and delicate constitutional questions. . . ."'I The Court's dispo12 Some commentators have suggested that a real showdown might come when
and if Powell presses his back salary claim. Further analysis makes this assertion
dubious. If the District Court enters a judgment against the Sergeant-at-Arms,
Congress can choose either to indemnify or not indemnify him, neither of which would
be a very effective resistance to the Court's mandate. If Powell is relegated to the
Court of Claims, it is indisputable that Congress has the power to refuse to pay
its judgments. Hence, such a refusal would again fail to create a confrontation or
impugn the Court's authority. See Glidden Co. v. Zdanok, 370 U.S. 530 (1962). In

a sense, this case may partake of some of the judicial statescraft of Justice Marshall.
The Court has succeeded in establishing its jurisdiction in a context which makes it
difficult for Congress to refute it.
13 U.S. CONST., art. I, § 5.
14 See, e.g., Dombrowski v. Eastland, 387 U.S. 82 (1967); United States v.
Johnson, 383 U.S. 169 (1966).
15 The Force Act of May 31, 1870, now incorporated in 28 U.S.C. 1344 (1964).
16 Powell v. McCormack, 395 U.S. 486 at 559 (1969) (Stewart, J. dissenting).
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sition of this point was equally plausible, if somewhat less well articulated than one might have hoped.17
On the justiciability issue, Justice Warren exhibited a purist
approach. While ostensibly using the six 8 criteria of justiciability
set forth in Baker v. Carr, he in effect reduced the six to one (the
first): Was the question of -the seating of representatives textually
committed to another branch for exclusive decision? If not, then by
definition no embarrassing conflict with or lack of respect for Congress could ensue, nor could there be an unusual need for adherence
to a decision already made. In effect, Warren said Justice Marshall
had decided that the Court should assume these risks when he committed the Court to judicial review. Justiciability thus was stripped
of policy considerations and made a matter of textual extrapolation.
In Warren's view, there was no textual commitment to Congress if
Congress were to judge its members' qualifications pursuant to the
standing requirements of Article I, requirements which obviously
constituted judicially manageable standards that could be implemented without the need for a nonjudicial policy decision. Thus, in
the Warren opinion the decision on justiciability became coterminous with judicial feasibility, which in turn became coterminous
17 The unusual mootness issue in Powell is the result of the respondents' unique
but historically plausible argument that the position of House Sergeant-at-Arms not
only expires but in effect disappears at the end of each session, and that Sergeantsat-Arms of subsequent Congresses are neither responsible for nor empowered to
remedy the misdeeds of their predecessors (even if they are, as here, the same person).
Normally, when a person or agency liable to pay a claim loses the ability to do so
because of change of officers, death or even abolition of office, the claim transfers
to another entity for payment (e.g., the successor in office, the estate, or another
agency). Respondents did not completely deny that it happened in Powell but
argued rather that since the claim now lay directly against the United States Treasury, a new form of action, a suit in the Court of Claims, needed to be commenced.
The Court's answer was (1) a declaratory judgment would still be useful in any
subsequent action to recover the salary; and (2) the issue of whether an action
would lie against the Sergeant-at-Arms was one that should have been determined
first in that Court of Appeals, the Supreme Court being free at this point to resolve
legal errors already made which could be considered prefatory to that issue. The
Court's answer itself suggests the manipulatory nature of the mootness doctrines.
18 ,. .
[1] a textually demonstrable constitutional commitment of the issue
to a coordinate political department; or [2] a lack of judicially discoverable and
manageable standards for resolving it; or [3] the impossibility of deciding without
an initial policy determination of a kind clearly for nonjudicial discretion; or [4] the
impossibility of a court's undertaking independent resolution without expressing lack
of the respect due coordinate branches of government, or [5] an unusual need for
unquestioning adherence to a political decision already made; or [6] the potentiality
of embarrassment from multifarious pronouncements by various departments on one
question." 395 U.S. at 518-19, quoting from Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 217 (1962).
While there is a considerable amount of redundancy and overlap in all six criteria,
in a general way it is possible to say that the first three focus more on technical considerations and the last three on policy considerations. See generally Baldwin &
Laughlin, supra note 7.
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with the decision on the merits. Once the merits were resolved, the
justiciability criteria fell into place.
The idea that the issue of justiciability (or what until recently
was called the issue of "political question") is at bottom a question
of textual interpretation-and not a matter for sound judicial discretion-is a position that has found few recent supporters. 19 But in
one sense, at least, Chief Justice Warren was eminently correct. A
decision that the Powell case posed a "political question" would
have been a victory for the respondents of equal or greater magnitude than a decision that Powell was properly excluded under
Article I, Section 5, for it would have conceded that Congress has
unfettered power to exclude members-elect for whatever reason it
chooses. Mootness was undoubtedly the only way to actually avoid
this issue.
Should the Court have used Justice Stewart's exit? I have already suggested that the "confrontation" aspect of the Powell case
has been overplayed. In Wesberry v. Sanders20 the Court had already successfully sent a substantial number of Congressmen back
home to private law practice and, at the very least, disturbed cozy
districting arrangements for many others. The Court's decision in
Powell got nobody out of jail, and was not even necessary to get
Powell back in the House.
In the Powell case, the democratic process was vindicated by
a quasi-democratic institution. It is, however, time the democratic
process vindicated itself. Whether judicial action or inaction is most
likely to cause it to do so has been the undercurrent of much constitutional analysis in recent years. On the surface, however, the issue is more often, and perhaps more properly, phrased in terms of
principled and reasoned decision-making. The decision of the Court
in Powell was a principled decision precisely because it was an exercise of reason on all of the information the Court was entitled to
utilize, and not the half-blind selective reasoning of the "new jurisprudence." Many of the proponents of reasoned and principled decision-making refuse to evaluate the Court's decisions by the one
criteria that should be most appropriate: Have the decisions of the
Court been reasonable applications of the fundamental principles
embodied by the Constitution? A simple evaluation of the Warren
Court is that it was good because most of its decisions were good.
(If another Court fails to make good decisions it will not be a good
Court.) If we cannot use reason to critique the substantive value
19 Professor Wechsler supports this position. See Wechsler, supra note 8.
20 376 U.S. 1 (1964).

